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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Following a trial in which the evidence reflected that 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant Vincent Wilkerson shot his victim 
in the chest and beat the victim with a gun, a Pennsylvania jury 
convicted Wilkerson of both attempted murder and aggravated 
assault.  In his instant petition for habeas corpus, Wilkerson 
contends that these convictions violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause because the jury instructions permitted the jury to 
convict on both offenses based on the shooting alone.  
Wilkerson also raises a challenge under Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to the trial judge’s imposition of 
an enhanced sentence for attempted murder based on a finding 
by the judge, but not the jury, that the victim suffered serious 
bodily injury and a related claim that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to this finding at sentencing or 
to raise the issue on direct appeal.  Because Wilkerson has not 
demonstrated that the state court’s rejection of his double 
jeopardy claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C 
§ 2254(d)(1), he cannot meet the high bar necessary to warrant 
habeas relief, and the District Court erred in granting his 
petition on that claim.  Further, because Wilkerson did not 
timely raise his Apprendi claim or related ineffective assistance 
claims, he is no more entitled to relief on those grounds.  
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Accordingly, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
I. Factual Background  
 All charges against Wilkerson arose from a violent 
altercation outside of a night club in 1997.  As reflected in the 
trial testimony, after Wilkerson approached a woman outside 
of the club and began talking to her and pulling on her clothing, 
a friend of hers, Nasir Hill, who was also leaving the night club, 
walked up to speak with her, prompting a heated verbal 
exchange in which Wilkerson accused Hill of being 
disrespectful for interrupting his conversation.  Although the 
argument ended quickly and the two men separated, Wilkerson 
returned moments later, knocked Hill unconscious with a 
punch to the face, and then, after positioning Hill’s body on the 
hood of a parked car, struck him in the head with a gun.  With 
Hill still lying unconscious, Wilkerson stepped back two-to-
four feet and shot Hill in the chest before fleeing the scene.   
 Wilkerson was charged with multiple crimes resulting 
from this incident including, among other things, attempted 
murder and aggravated assault.  At the conclusion of his trial, 
the judge instructed the jury as to the various counts.  As part 
of the instructions for the charge of attempted murder, the trial 
judge told the jury that a conviction would require that it find 
Wilkerson “did a certain act” and “[i]n this case that act is 
alleged to be a shooting . . . of [Hill],” App. 586.  With respect 
to the crime of aggravated assault, the trial judge instructed the 
jury that, in order to convict, it would have to find “that 
[Wilkerson] caused or attempted to cause serious bodily injury 
to [Hill].” App. 587.  Of relevance to this appeal, the trial judge 
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did not specify that Wilkerson’s shooting Hill could not, in 
addition to serving as the basis for an attempted murder 
conviction, also serve as the “attempt[] to cause serious bodily 
injury” for the aggravated assault conviction, and, after 
deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts 
on a general verdict form that likewise did not specify whether 
the “serious bodily injury” finding underlying the aggravated 
assault conviction related to the shooting or the assault that 
preceded it.   
 Wilkerson was sentenced to ten-to-twenty years of 
incarceration on the aggravated assault conviction and twenty-
to-forty years on the attempted murder conviction to be served 
consecutively.1  That sentence for attempted murder reflected 
an enhancement, allowable under Pennsylvania law only 
where there has been a finding of “serious bodily injury,” 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1102(c)—a finding that here was made only 
by the judge at sentencing and had not been submitted to the 
jury.   
II. Procedural History  
A. Direct Appeal and Collateral Review in 
Pennsylvania State Court  
                                                 
 1 Wilkerson was originally sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole under Pennsylvania’s “three 
strikes” law, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9714(a)(2)(1982 & Supp. 
1997). That sentence was vacated after the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court declared § 9714 unconstitutional, and the 
instant sentence was imposed.  
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 Wilkerson appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
and argued that his convictions for attempted murder and 
aggravated assault should have merged for sentencing 
purposes.  In making this argument, Wilkerson relied on 
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 650 A.2d 20 (Pa. 1994), where 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that aggravated 
assault is a lesser included offense2 of attempted murder, so 
that if the convictions on both counts are based on the same 
criminal act, the sentences for the two crimes “merge” as a 
matter of state law.  Id. at 24.  Thus, Wilkerson asserted, 
because the bills of information under which he was charged 
and the jury instructions given at his trial reflected that he was 
convicted of both attempted murder and aggravated assault on 
the basis of a single violent episode, his sentences for the two 
crimes should have merged.   
 The Superior Court rejected that argument, holding that 
Anderson only applies “in those instances where multiple 
punishments arise from a single act,” and that Wilkerson’s 
convictions stemmed from two separate acts: (1) shooting Hill 
in the chest (the attempted murder), and (2) striking Hill with 
a gun (the aggravated assault).  App. 717-18.  According to the 
Superior Court, Wilkerson’s challenge therefore was “more 
properly characterized as a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence underlying the convictions.”  App. 718.  As it 
concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the finding 
that Wilkerson was guilty of both criminal acts, the Superior 
Court affirmed Wilkerson’s convictions and sentence.   
                                                 
 2 A lesser included offense is one that “does not require 
proof of any additional element beyond those required by the 
greater offense.”  Government of Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 
671 F.2d 758, 765 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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Wilkerson then filed a petition pursuant to 
Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), raising a 
different claim not relevant to this appeal.  The PCRA court 
dismissed Wilkerson’s petition, and the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court affirmed.  
B. Federal Habeas Proceedings  
 
 Having been denied relief in state court, Wilkerson filed 
a petition for federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  In that petition, Wilkerson claimed, among 
other things, that his convictions for both attempted murder 
and aggravated assault on the basis of the same conduct 
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  A little over a year after filing his original 
petition, Wilkerson filed an “Amended Petition in Support of 
Memorandum of Law,” in which he asserted for the first time 
that the application of the enhancement to his attempted 
murder sentence, reflecting the trial judge’s finding of serious 
bodily injury, violated Apprendi because “the element of 
serious bodily injury was not made part of the jury instruction 
with respect to the charge of attempted murder.”  Supp. App. 
38.  
 Wilkerson’s habeas petition was referred to a 
Magistrate Judge who recommended that the District Court 
grant relief with respect to Wilkerson’s double jeopardy claim 
and deny his petition with respect to all other claims.  When 
addressing Wilkerson’s Apprendi challenge, the Magistrate 
Judge agreed with Wilkerson that an error occurred when he 
was sentenced above the twenty-year statutory maximum 
without the requisite factual finding by the jury but held that 
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this error was harmless and did not warrant habeas relief 
because it was “inconceivable that a properly-instructed jury 
would not find that Wilkerson created a substantial risk of 
Hill’s death.”  App. 77.  While the Commonwealth filed an 
objection to the Magistrate Judge’s double jeopardy 
recommendation, Wilkerson did not object on any ground.   
  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendations in full.  With respect to Wilkerson’s double 
jeopardy claim, the District Court held that the state court’s 
decision to apply a sufficiency of the evidence analysis to 
Wilkerson’s merger claim on direct appeal was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.  
Reasoning that the proper question for courts to consider when 
faced with a challenge to a trial court’s jury instructions is 
“whether there is reasonable likelihood that the jury has 
applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the 
Constitution,” App. 12 (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 
62, 72 (1991)), the District Court determined the instructions 
here were framed in a way that allowed the jury to conclude 
that the shooting could form the basis of both the attempted 
murder and aggravated assault convictions. Thus, the District 
Court held “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the jury 
applied the trial court’s attempted murder and aggravated 
assault instructions in an impermissible manner, and thus 
convicted [Wilkerson] of two crimes for a single act” in 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  App. 14.   
 As for Wilkerson’s Apprendi claim, the District Court 
observed that “neither party ha[d] objected” to the Magistrate 
Judge’s analysis beyond the double jeopardy claim, including 
the Magistrate Judge’s rejection of the sentencing challenge, 
and it proceeded to adopt the Report and Recommendation in 
full—granting Wilkerson relief on his double jeopardy claim 
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and denying relief on his Apprendi claim.  This appeal and 
cross-appeal followed.   
 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.  
Where, as here, the District Court based its rulings on the 
evidence contained in the state court record and did not conduct 
an evidentiary hearing or engage in any independent fact-
finding, our review of the District Court’s decision is plenary.  
McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 1993).  
 Our review of the state court’s judgment is governed by 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), which imposes significant procedural and 
substantive limitations on the scope of our review.  Two such 
limitations have particular bearing on this appeal.  First, a 
petitioner must “ha[ve] exhausted the remedies available in the 
courts of the State,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), before seeking 
federal habeas relief, and a claim will be deemed unexhausted 
if the petitioner “has the right under the law of the State to raise, 
by any available procedure, the question presented,” but has 
failed to do so, id. § 2254(c).  This exhaustion requirement does 
not require a habeas petitioner to cite the federal Constitution 
“book and verse,” but rather to have “fairly presented” his 
federal claim to the state courts.  McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 
F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 
U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971)).  That is, the petitioner must have 
“present[ed] a federal claim’s factual and legal substance to the 
state courts in a manner that put[] [the state courts] on notice 
that a federal claim [was] being asserted.”  Id.  If a petitioner’s 
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federal claim was not “fairly presented,” and further state-court 
review is no longer available under state law, the claim is 
“procedurally defaulted . . . and . . . may be entertained in a 
federal habeas petition only if there is a basis for excusing the 
procedural default.”  Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 223-24 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
 Second, where a state court has rejected a petitioner’s 
claim on the merits, AEDPA limits the scope of our substantive 
review to whether the state court’s decision “was contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  A state court decision is 
“contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court 
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 
Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court 
decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a 
set of materially indistinguishable facts.”  Pazden v. Maurer, 
424 F.3d 303, 311 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)).  A decision involves an 
“unreasonable application” of federal law if “no ‘fairminded 
jurist’ could agree with the state court’s decision.”  Vickers v. 
Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 
2017) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)) 
(alteration omitted).  If this threshold seems “difficult to meet,” 
the Supreme Court has advised that is because “it was meant 
to be.”  Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.  Thus, we may not grant 
relief “simply because we disagree with the state court’s 
decision or because we would have reached a different result if 
left to our own devices,” Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 197 
(3d Cir. 2000), but only if the state court’s decision “was so 
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
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fairminded disagreement,” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 
2199 (2015).   
 
IV. Analysis  
 With these standards in mind, we will first address the 
Commonwealth’s appeal of the District Court’s grant of habeas 
relief on Wilkerson’s double jeopardy claim, and then turn to 
Wilkerson’s cross-appeal of the District Court’s denial of 
habeas relief on his Apprendi claim.  
A. Wilkerson’s Double Jeopardy Claim  
 The Commonwealth contends that the District Court 
made two errors in granting Wilkerson habeas relief on his 
double jeopardy claim: first, it should not have reached the 
merits because that claim was not raised as a double jeopardy 
claim in the state court and thus was unexhausted and 
procedurally defaulted; and, second, it did not apply proper 
AEDPA deference in its review on the merits.  We address 
these arguments in turn. 
1.  Procedural Default 
 
 A petitioner seeking § 2254 relief from a Pennsylvania 
conviction exhausts his state remedies for a federal claim either 
by raising the claim on direct appeal or in a petition for 
collateral relief under the PCRA.3  Robinson v. Beard, 762 F.3d 
                                                 
 3 Although Wilkerson did not seek discretionary review 
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we have held that a 
petitioner need not seek such relief for his claims to be eligible 
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316, 328 (3d Cir. 2014).  Here, it is undisputed that Wilkerson 
did not explicitly state that he was raising a federal 
constitutional claim under the Double Jeopardy Clause in 
either of those fora.  It is also undisputed, however, that he did 
seek relief under Pennsylvania’s merger doctrine on direct 
appeal, and the parties’ disagreement centers on whether that 
state law merger claim, in the terms he argued it, was sufficient 
to “fairly present” his federal double jeopardy claim to the state 
court.4  
                                                 
for federal habeas review.  Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 
233 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 
4 The Commonwealth also asserts that, even if 
Wilkerson’s arguments on his merger claim were sufficient to 
present his double jeopardy claim to the state appellate court, 
his claim still was not properly exhausted because he did not 
first raise them in the trial court.  This argument misapprehends 
the purpose of the exhaustion and procedural default rules, 
which are intended to ensure that habeas petitioners “meet the 
State’s procedural requirements for presenting [their] federal 
claims” and do not “deprive[] the state courts of an opportunity 
to address those claims in the first instance,” Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991)—not to impose 
additional procedural burdens that go beyond those required by 
the state courts themselves.  Here, because the state appellate 
court addressed Wilkerson’s merger claim on the merits, 
irrespective of his failure to raise it in the trial court, our focus 
for federal habeas purposes is on the decision of the appellate 
court.  Robinson, 762 F.3d at 328 (federal claims exhausted so 
long as they were properly presented “on direct appeal or in a 
petition under the PCRA”).  Thus, if we agree with Wilkerson 
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 We have held that a state prisoner may “fairly present” 
a federal claim to state courts without specifically referencing 
the federal Constitution or a federal statute in four ways: “(a) 
reliance on pertinent federal cases employing constitutional 
analysis, (b) reliance on state cases employing constitutional 
analysis in like fact situations, (c) assertion of the claim in 
terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right protected 
by the Constitution, and (d) allegation of a pattern of facts that 
is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation.”  
McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261-62 (quoting Evans v. Court of 
Common Pleas, Delaware Cty., Pa., 959 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d 
Cir. 1992)).5   
In view of the close relationship between 
Pennsylvania’s merger doctrine and federal double jeopardy 
jurisprudence, and Wilkerson’s citation to Anderson, which 
itself relies on Supreme Court jurisprudence, we conclude that 
Wilkerson has “assert[ed] [his] claim[s] in terms so particular 
                                                 
that his merger claim put the Superior Court “on notice” that 
he was making a federal double jeopardy argument and that the 
court rejected that argument, his double jeopardy claim was 
properly exhausted.  McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261.  
  
5 To the extent the Commonwealth implies that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 31 
(2004), may have imposed a higher standard for “fair 
presentation” than the standard we articulated in McCandless, 
our Court has already rejected that very argument.  Nara v. 
Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 198 n.17. (3d Cir. 2007).  
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as to call to mind a specific right protected by the 
Constitution,” and thus did fairly present his claim to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court.  Id.  The Double Jeopardy Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment prescribes that “[n]o person shall 
be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb,” U.S. Const. amend. V, and it “protects not only 
against a second trial for the same offense, but also against 
multiple punishments for the same offense,” Whalen v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  To assess whether two crimes constitute the “same 
offense” for double jeopardy purposes, we employ the test 
established by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).  That is, “where the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are 
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires 
proof of a fact which the other does not.”  Id. at 304.  If this 
test yields “only one” offense, “cumulative sentences are not 
permitted, unless elsewhere specially authorized by Congress.”  
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 693.  
In Anderson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court imported 
this federal double jeopardy test into its merger doctrine under 
state law.  In that case, the petitioner had been convicted of 
aggravated assault and attempted murder on the basis of a 
single shooting and argued that his sentences should have 
“merged.”  650 A.2d at 20-21.  When analyzing the petitioner’s 
claim, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the analysis 
necessary to resolve the defendant’s merger claim was 
“identical to the inquiry as to whether the double jeopardy 
protection of the Fifth Amendment has been violated.”  Id. at 
23.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that, when a 
defendant is charged with two crimes on the basis of the same 
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criminal act, “there is no difference between a double jeopardy 
analysis and a merger analysis” because “the operative 
consideration in both is whether the elements of the offenses 
are the same or different.”  Id.  And it proceeded to apply the 
Blockburger test to evaluate whether aggravated assault and 
attempted murder would constitute the “same offense” for 
merger purposes, concluding petitioner’s sentence for his 
aggravated assault conviction must be vacated because 
“aggravated assault is necessarily included within the offense 
of attempted murder,” id. at 24.  
 Here, Wilkerson argued on direct appeal that his 
sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault should 
have been merged because both convictions arose from the 
same criminal act and, per Anderson, aggravated assault is a 
lesser included offense of attempted murder.  Wilkerson 
directed the Superior Court to the jury instruction given at his 
trial for attempted murder, asserting that by convicting him on 
that charge, the jury “[n]ecessarily . . . also found that he 
intended to inflict serious bodily harm upon the victim,” and 
that to convict him on the aggravated assault charge, the jury 
was also only required to find that Wilkerson “caused or 
attempted to cause serious bodily injury to . . . the victim.”  
App. 730.  To reinforce his argument that he was convicted and 
sentenced twice for the same criminal act, Wilkerson also cited 
to the bills of information under which he was charged and 
pointed out that they did not distinguish which facts formed the 
basis of his attempted murder charge and which formed the 
basis of his aggravated assault charge.  Thus, Wilkerson urged, 
because both convictions stemmed from the same criminal 
conduct and, under Anderson, aggravated assault is a lesser 
included offense of attempted murder, “the failure of the [trial] 
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court to merge the sentence[] on aggravated assault with the 
sentence on attempted murder was error.”  App. 733.  
 Considering that the Pennsylvania state law doctrine 
invoked by Wilkerson is based on Supreme Court case law and 
involves an analysis that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
described as “identical” to that governing a federal double 
jeopardy claim,6 Anderson, 650 A.2d at 23, we are persuaded 
that the Superior Court had fair notice of that claim and 
rejected it on the merits.7  McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261.  
                                                 
 6 The Commonwealth contends that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court misconstrued federal law in Anderson, as the 
test it announced for analyzing a state law merger claim is not 
“identical” to a federal double jeopardy analysis.  This 
argument misses the mark, as what is relevant for purposes of 
our analysis of fair notice is that Anderson explicitly adopted 
the Blockburger test.  
 
 7 The Commonwealth also urges that Wilkerson’s 
merger claim could not have alerted the state court that he was 
asserting a federal double jeopardy claim because merger and 
double jeopardy claims are subject to different waiver rules 
and, when successful, provide different remedies.  Accepting 
these distinctions as accurate, they are irrelevant to whether 
Wilkerson fairly presented his double jeopardy claim in state 
court.  Waiver is not an issue in this case and, although merger 
is a challenge to a defendant’s sentence, Anderson, 650 A.2d 
at 21, while double jeopardy is a challenge to the underlying 
conviction, Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 301-02 
(1996), the remedy that would follow from the finding of a 
violation is likewise immaterial to whether the nature of the 
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 Having satisfied any threshold concerns as to whether 
AEDPA allows us to address Wilkerson’s double jeopardy 
claim, we now turn to the merits of that claim to assess whether 
the state court’s analysis was “contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).   
2.  The Merits 
 Before we address the central issue of the parties’ 
dispute, we take note of two points on which they agree.  First, 
as set forth in Anderson, aggravated assault is a lesser-included 
offense of attempted murder under Pennsylvania law.  That 
is—if one criminal act served as the basis for both of 
Wilkerson’s convictions, he has been punished twice for the 
“same offense” in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  
See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 692; Anderson, 650 A.2d at 24.  
Second, as even Wilkerson seems to acknowledge, based on 
the evidence at trial, a properly instructed jury could have 
convicted Wilkerson of attempted murder and aggravated 
assault on the basis of two distinct criminal acts.  In other 
words, Wilkerson does not contest that the Commonwealth 
adduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that 
he both shot Hill, supporting the attempted murder conviction, 
and beat Hill, supporting the aggravated assault conviction.   
Where the parties part ways, however, is on the 
appropriate test to assess whether Wilkerson was legally 
convicted of both offenses based on separate criminal acts, or 
                                                 
violation claimed put the state court “on notice that a federal 
claim [was] being asserted,” McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261. 
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if he was illegally convicted twice on the basis of the shooting 
alone.  According to the Commonwealth, the proper test is 
whether a reasonable jury could have convicted Wilkerson on 
both counts, so that a reviewing court need look no further than 
the trial evidence to determine, as the Superior Court did, 
whether it was sufficient to support both convictions.  
Wilkerson, on the other hand, urges that the relevant inquiry is 
not whether a reasonable jury could have premised the 
convictions on two different acts given the evidence at trial, but 
whether the jury in his case actually did so—a question that 
requires a reviewing court (1) to look not merely to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, but also to the indictment and jury 
instructions,8 and (2) to construe any ambiguity as to the basis 
of the jury’s conviction in the defendant’s favor.  That is, 
according to Wilkerson, if it is possible the jury convicted him 
twice based on the shooting alone, his multiple convictions 
cannot stand.   
 
On direct appeal, the state court applied the analysis 
now advocated by the Commonwealth, treating Wilkerson’s 
claim as one of “sufficiency of the evidence,” and holding that 
because the evidence at trial could have supported separate 
convictions for aggravated assault and attempted murder, there 
was no merger or double jeopardy violation.  App. 718-20.  Our 
                                                 
 8 In his briefing, Wilkerson appeared to take the position 
that, when assessing the basis for a jury’s verdict, a reviewing 
court may not consider the evidence presented at trial at all, 
and must confine its inquiry to only the indictment, jury 
instructions, jury interrogatories, and verdict sheet.  Wilkerson 
reversed course at oral argument, however, and conceded that 
a review of the entire trial record is appropriate when 
evaluating the grounds on which a jury reached its verdict.   
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task on federal habeas review is not to decide whether we agree 
with this treatment of Wilkerson’s claim or with the result the 
state court reached, but to analyze whether the state court’s 
ruling “was so lacking in justification” that, based on existing 
Supreme Court case law, it was unreasonable “beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement.”  Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 
2199 (citation omitted).  Upon review of the Supreme Court’s 
double jeopardy jurisprudence and our Court’s precedents in 
this context, we conclude that Wilkerson cannot satisfy this 
high threshold.9  
 
                                                 
 9 Wilkerson argues that AEDPA’s deferential standard 
does not apply to his double jeopardy claim because, by re-
characterizing his merger claim as a sufficiency of the evidence 
challenge, the state court did not address the merits of that 
claim.  This argument is meritless. When addressing 
Wilkerson’s merger claim, the state court explained that 
merger only applies “in those instances where multiple 
punishments arise from a single act” and, because Wilkerson’s 
attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions 
“stemmed from his alleged commission of two separate 
criminal acts,” relief was not warranted.  App. 717-18.  By 
concluding that Wilkerson’s multiple convictions each derived 
from a distinct criminal act, the state court unambiguously 
addressed and rejected Wilkerson’s merger/double jeopardy 
claim on the merits.  In any event, Wilkerson explicitly argued 
that AEDPA dictated the appropriate standard of review in his 
petition for habeas relief before the District Court, and any 
argument to the contrary is therefore waived, see Bailey v. 
United Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 202 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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The Supreme Court has never spoken directly to the 
appropriate test to determine whether multiple convictions 
resulting from the same trial were based on one criminal act or 
two.  However, it has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause 
in an analogous context—cases in which a defendant 
previously has been acquitted of one charge and the 
Government seeks to prosecute the same defendant on another 
charge, arguably based on the same criminal act.  And in those 
“issue preclusion”10 cases, the Supreme Court assessed what 
facts formed the basis of a jury’s verdict on the one charge in 
order to determine whether a double jeopardy violation would 
occur if a trial were to move forward on the other, in effect 
employing the very test applied by the Superior Court here.   
 In Ashe v. Swenson, for instance, the Supreme Court 
explained that, in the double jeopardy issue preclusion context, 
a reviewing court must “examine the record of a prior 
proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, 
charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a 
rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue 
other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from 
consideration.”  397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Ashe makes clear that the 
correct approach in the issue preclusion context is to review the 
entire trial record in an attempt to discern the basis of the jury’s 
conviction but that, where no clear answer emerges, the tie 
                                                 
 10 Although the parties use the term “collateral estoppel” 
to describe the question at issue in those circumstances, the 
Supreme Court has recently advised that “‘issue preclusion’ is 
the more descriptive term.”  Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 
137 S. Ct. 352, 356 n.1 (2016).   
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goes to the Government: so long as a reasonable jury “could 
have” based its decision on facts that would not create a double 
jeopardy violation, the subsequent prosecution may move 
forward.  Id.; see also Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 
S. Ct. 352, 365-66 (2016) (inconsistent verdict at first trial did 
not prevent retrial on vacated conviction because it was a 
“mystery what the jury necessarily decided” and, therefore, the 
defendants could not “establish the factual predicate necessary 
to preclude the Government from retrying them . . . namely, 
that the jury in the first proceeding actually decided that they 
did not violate the [statute in question]”); United States v. 
Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 219 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc) (denying 
issue preclusion double jeopardy claim because it was 
“impossible to determine with any certainty” whether the issue 
in question was “definitively decided” at previous trial).  
 Moreover, although the Supreme Court has addressed 
this issue only in the issue preclusion context, we have 
addressed it in the context of multiple convictions resulting 
from a single trial—applying the exact same test.  For example, 
in United States v. Finley, the defendant argued that a double 
jeopardy violation occurred when he was convicted of both 
“receiving” and “distributing” child pornography, each a 
distinct violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).  726 F.3d 483, 495 
(3d Cir. 2013).  When analyzing whether the defendant had 
been convicted of multiple criminal acts or wrongly punished 
multiple times for one act, we assessed the evidence presented 
at trial and concluded that because the evidence supported 
separate convictions for separate criminal acts, no double 
jeopardy violation had occurred.  Id. at 496.  Likewise, in 
United States v. Chorin, the defendant argued that his 
convictions for both the attempt to manufacture more than one 
kilogram of methamphetamine, and for the possession of 
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monomethylamine knowing, or having reasonable cause to 
believe, that it would be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.  322 
F.3d 274, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2003).  Citing primarily to the trial 
testimony, we concluded that the defendant “possessed 
different methylamine liquid at different places for different 
purposes on different occasions,” and thus his convictions were 
not “based on the same predicate act  
or transaction,” and no double jeopardy violation had occurred.  
Id. at 282.   
 Against the backdrop of Ashe and these other double 
jeopardy cases, the Superior Court’s analysis can hardly be 
deemed “an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established 
Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  On the contrary, that 
court reviewed the trial record and determined that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Wilkerson of 
attempted murder based on the shooting and to convict him of 
aggravated assault based on the beating—concluding, in 
substance, that the jury “could have” reached its verdicts on 
grounds that posed no double jeopardy concern.  Ashe, 397 
U.S. at 444.  Thus, although “sufficiency of the evidence” may 
have been an inartful descriptor,11 App. 718, the approach the 
                                                 
 11 In the double jeopardy context, of course, the inquiry 
cannot be strictly limited to sufficiency, as there may be 
situations where the trial evidence would allow a jury to 
convict on grounds that would not violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, but, once the jury instructions or indictment are 
considered, it becomes apparent the jury did, in fact, base its 
verdict on unconstitutional grounds.  E.g., if the trial judge in 
this case had instructed: “If you find that Mr. Wilkerson shot 
Mr. Hill, you must return a verdict of guilty as to both 
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Superior Court took and the conclusion that it reached appear 
entirely consistent with Ashe and its progeny.12   
 At the very least, absent Supreme Court precedent 
dictating that a different analysis is required when a 
defendant’s double jeopardy claim arises in this “multiple 
punishment” context rather than in the context of issue 
                                                 
attempted murder and aggravated assault.”  In such situations, 
while there may be “sufficient evidence” for the jury to convict 
on constitutional grounds, an examination of the record as a 
whole may preclude a determination that a rational jury “could 
have” convicted on those grounds as it would have been 
explicitly instructed to do otherwise.  Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444.  
Here, however, where the jury instructions were merely 
ambiguous and did not foreclose the jury from rendering 
multiple constitutionally sound convictions, the state court was 
not unreasonable in sustaining those convictions based on the 
sufficiency of the trial evidence. 
 
 12 Although Wilkerson points us to two Supreme Court 
cases in the issue preclusion context that reach the opposite 
outcome, both cases are simply applications of Ashe in which 
the trial record precluded the possibility that the jury “could 
have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which 
the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration,” Ashe, 
397 U.S. at 444.  See, e.g., Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 
369 (1972) (per curiam) (applying Ashe and ruling in 
defendant’s favor on issue preclusion double jeopardy claim 
because “[t]he only logical conclusion” from the trial record 
was that the defendant had already been acquitted of the act for 
which the Government sought to retry him).   
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preclusion, the Superior Court’s analysis cannot be deemed 
“contrary to” any “clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1), or so unreasonable as to put it “beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement,” Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 
2199; see also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) 
(“Given the lack of holdings from this Court [on the specific 
issue in question], it cannot be said that the state court 
“unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.” 
(second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
Wilkerson counters that there is such precedent to be 
found in the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence.  
Specifically, Wilkerson cites to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Griffin v. United States, where the Court explained that 
“where a provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on a 
particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a 
general verdict that may have rested on that ground.”  502 U.S. 
46, 53 (1991).  Because the jury instructions and verdict sheet 
here leave open the possibility that Wilkerson’s attempted 
murder and aggravated assault convictions likewise may have 
rested on the impermissible basis of a single criminal act, the 
shooting, Wilkerson argues that one of those convictions must 
be vacated.  This argument dovetails with the reasoning of the 
District Court which, relying on due process case law, granted 
Wilkerson habeas relief because it concluded that there was a 
“‘reasonable likelihood’ that the jury applied the trial court’s 
attempted murder and aggravated assault instructions in an 
impermissible manner.”  App. 14 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 
72).  
 We acknowledge the tension between the Supreme 
Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence—which gives the 
benefit of the doubt to the Government and allows for a second 
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criminal prosecution to move forward so long as the jury in the 
prior proceeding “could have grounded its verdict” on facts 
that would not create a double jeopardy violation, Ashe, 397 
U.S. at 444 (emphasis added)—and its due process 
jurisprudence—which gives that same benefit to the defendant 
and requires reversal so long as the conviction “may have 
rested” on an unconstitutional basis, Griffin, 502 U.S. at 53, or 
there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury applied an 
ambiguous instruction “in a way that violates the 
Constitution,”  Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); this case, however, arising in the context of 
deferential habeas review is not the forum for our Court to 
resolve that tension.  While we commend the District Court’s 
thoughtful analysis and recognize that we may need to address 
this issue at a later date if it comes before us on direct appeal, 
it is sufficient under AEDPA that the jury could have convicted 
Wilkerson on separate counts of attempted murder and 
aggravated assault, Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444, and thus, no double 
jeopardy violation occurred in this case. 
 Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s order 
granting Wilkerson relief on that claim, and turn to 
Wilkerson’s cross-appeal challenging the sentence imposed for 
his attempted murder conviction.  
B. Wilkerson’s Apprendi Claim  
 The claim at issue in Wilkerson’s cross-appeal rests on 
the trial judge’s failure to ask the jury to decide whether 
“serious bodily injury result[ed],” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1102(c), 
from Wilkerson’s attempted murder before she imposed a 
sentence enhancement on that charge.  See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
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statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 910 
A.2d 60, 67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that, under 
Apprendi, “it was not the prerogative of the trial court, but 
solely the responsibility of the jury . . . to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, whether a serious bodily injury resulted from 
[an] attempted murder”).  Wilkerson asserts that he is entitled 
to habeas relief because his attempted murder sentence 
contravened Apprendi and also because his counsel’s failure to 
either object at sentencing or to raise the issue on appeal 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  
 The Commonwealth does not contest the error but urges 
that Wilkerson is not entitled to habeas relief because: (1) we 
lack jurisdiction to hear Wilkerson’s cross-appeal because he 
did not timely file a notice of appeal under Rule 4(a)(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; (2) Wilkerson’s claim 
is time barred under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations; 
(3) the claim is procedurally defaulted; and (4) even if we have 
jurisdiction and can reach the merits of Wilkerson’s claim, it 
fails on the merits under the appropriate standard of review.   
 Although we conclude we have jurisdiction over the 
claim, we agree with the Commonwealth that Wilkerson’s 
cross-appeal is time barred under AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations, and thus have no need to reach his remaining 
arguments.13  
                                                 
 13 Because we conclude that Wilkerson’s failure to 
timely raise his Apprendi and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claims bars him from habeas relief, we will neither address 
whether these claims were also procedurally defaulted nor, as 
Wilkerson asserts, qualify for the narrow exception to 
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1.  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure  
4(a)(3)  
 We turn first to the Commonwealth’s assertion that we 
lack jurisdiction over Wilkerson’s cross-appeal because 
Wilkerson failed to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(3).  Under this rule, “[i]f one party timely files 
a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal 
within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed.”  
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3).  Wilkerson did not file his cross-appeal 
within that allotted time frame, and the Commonwealth 
maintains that this failure divests us of our jurisdiction to even 
consider his cross-appeal.   
 Our Court has recently addressed this very issue, 
however, and reached the opposite conclusion.  As we 
explained in Mathias v. Superintendent Frackville, No. 15-
2694, 2017 WL 3687781, *10-14 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2017), Rule 
4(a)(3) is not a jurisdictional constraint, but a “claim-
processing” rule that we may excuse in the interests of justice.  
Id. at *13.  And as a claim-processing rule, it remains subject 
to forfeiture and waiver, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 
214 (2007); Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 455 (3d Cir. 
2012); Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 187, 197 (3d 
Cir. 2008)—doctrines that dispose of the Commonwealth’s 
objection here in view of its failure to move to dismiss 
Wilkerson’s untimely cross-appeal despite multiple 
                                                 
AEDPA’s procedural default rule announced by the Supreme 
Court in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).  
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opportunities to do so over the course of six months prior to the 
instant merits briefing.14   
 Given its persistent refusal to oppose Wilkerson’s cross-
appeal on Rule 4(a)(3) grounds despite numerous invitations to 
do so, the Commonwealth forfeited that challenge to 
Wilkerson’s cross-appeal, Baker, 670 F.3d at 455, and we 
move on to address whether Wilkerson’s Apprendi and related 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims were timely raised.   
2.  Timeliness   
 
                                                 
 14  When Wilkerson filed his notice of appeal on July 9, 
2015, our Court’s Clerk’s Office noted the possible 
jurisdictional concern and gave both parties the opportunity to 
address Rule 4(a)(3)’s application in this case.  Wilkerson 
responded to the Clerk’s Office’s letter and requested a 
certificate of appealability on the Apprendi issue now set forth 
in his cross-appeal.  The Commonwealth, however, failed to 
respond to the Clerk’s Office’s letter or to Wilkerson’s motion. 
The Commonwealth was then given yet another opportunity to 
take a position on Wilkerson’s late notice of cross-appeal, as a 
motion’s panel of our Court sent Wilkerson’s request for a 
certificate of appealibility back to the District Court.  The 
Commonwealth, however, again failed to oppose Wilkerson’s 
motion.  As a result, the District Court granted Wilkerson a 
certificate of appealability in January 2016, and the case then 
returned to us for merits briefing.  Only in its merits brief did 
the Commonwealth assert for the very first time that 
Wilkerson’s claim must be dismissed for failure to comply 
with Rule 4(a)(3).   
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 In addition to the requirements described above, 
AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on state 
inmates seeking to file habeas claims in federal court.  28 
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  If an inmate complies with this deadline, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow him, like other any 
civil litigant, to later amend his petition to add additional 
claims so long as those additional claims “arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be 
set out—in the original pleading.” Fed R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).  
Here, it is not contested that Wilkerson filed a timely habeas 
petition raising his double jeopardy claim but did not file the 
“Amended Petition in Support of Memorandum of Law” that 
added his Apprendi claim until well after the one-year mark.15  
Supp. App. 36.  The timeliness of Wilkerson’s Apprendi-
related claims therefore depends on whether they “relate back” 
to the double jeopardy claim in his original habeas petition. 
   
 We conclude that they do not.  In Mayle v. Felix, the 
Supreme Court addressed how this relation back rule applies 
in the context of a habeas petition.  545 U.S. 644 (2005).  The 
petitioner in Mayle had filed a petition asserting that his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses had been 
                                                 
 15 It appears that, even in his amended petition, 
Wilkerson did not raise his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claims that he has now derived from his Apprendi claim, and 
that claim is therefore waived, Bailey, 279 F.3d at 202.  
Nonetheless, even assuming the ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims were somehow implicit in the underlying 
Apprendi claim, they were not timely raised for the reasons 
explained below.   
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violated when the trial judge admitted certain out-of-court 
statements made by a jailhouse informant.  Id. at 650-51.  The 
petitioner then sought to amend his petition to add another 
claim—this time that his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination had been violated when the trial judge allowed 
the prosecutor to introduce statements the petitioner had made 
during a pretrial police interrogation.  Id. at 651-52.  The 
Supreme Court rejected this amendment as time barred, 
explaining that while both claims related to the admission of 
pre-trial statements, those statements “were separated [from 
each other] in time and type,” id. at 657, and the petitioner had 
thus defined “ar[ising] out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence” for relation back purposes at “too high a level of 
generality,” id. at 661 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
Court elaborated that two claims merely arising from the same 
“conviction or sentence” cannot be enough to satisfy the 
relation back standard and that, in order to properly relate to 
one another, the claims in the amendment and the claims in the 
original petition must be “tied to a common core of operative 
facts.”  Id. at 657, 664. 
 Wilkerson urges that his claims meet this standard 
because both his double jeopardy claim and his Apprendi claim 
“arise from . . . the jury instructions, the jury verdict and the 
sentence imposed,” Second Step Br. 49, and “both hinge upon 
[a] serious bodily injury finding,” Fourth Step Br. 15.  This 
explanation falls short.  Like the petitioner in Mayle, Wilkerson 
defines the “same conduct, transaction, or occurrence” 
necessary for relation back at “too high a level of generality.”  
Mayle, 545 U.S. at 661 (internal quotation marks omitted).  To 
say that the claims relate to the same “jury verdict and sentence 
imposed” is just another way of couching the argument 
explicitly rejected in Mayle—that relation back can be satisfied 
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simply because the amendment and petition pertain to the same 
“conviction or sentence.”  Id. at 657.  Although both claims in 
this case also coincidentally relate to the jury charge and 
involve the term “serious bodily injury,” these common 
features are not enough to make the claims arise from the same 
“operative facts” when the problems asserted with the jury 
charge are entirely unrelated,  id. at 664.   
 The operative fact underlying Wilkerson’s double 
jeopardy claim is that, for the aggravated assault charge, the 
jury instruction stated that Wilkerson could be found guilty for 
“caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause serious bodily injury,” App. 
587, without specifying that, if he was also convicted of 
attempted murder, his shooting of Nasir Hill could not be the 
act that satisfied that requirement.  The operative facts for 
Wilkerson’s Apprendi-related claims, on the other hand, are 
that for the attempted murder charge, the jury was never asked 
to determine whether Wilkerson inflicted serious bodily injury 
at all, and his counsel did not object on this ground at 
sentencing or raise the issue on direct appeal.  These claims are 
not the same in “time and type,” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657, but 
are distinct claims with their own factual predicates that 
happen to involve the presence or absence of the phrase 
“serious bodily injury” in the jury instructions.16  For these 
                                                 
 16 Perhaps recognizing the attenuated relationship 
between his original petition and its subsequent amendment, 
Wilkerson contends that his relation back claim should be 
accorded liberal treatment because he filed his original habeas 
petition and amendment pro se.  While pro se litigants are, as a 
general matter, given more lenient treatment when assessing 
their compliance with pleading requirements, Haines v. 
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam), the 
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reasons, Wilkerson’s untimely Apprendi claim and related 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims do not relate back to 
his original petition for habeas corpus, and these claims are 
therefore barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.17  
                                                 
petitioner in Mayle itself was pro se, Mayle, 545 U.S. at 648, 
eliminating any possibility that the Supreme Court’s 
explanation of the relation back requirements in the habeas 
context would not apply with equal force to a pro se petitioner. 
 17 Even if we could reach the merits of Wilkerson’s 
Apprendi claim, it would fail under the applicable standard of 
review.  Because Wilkerson did not object to the Magistrate 
Judge’s Report and Recommendation denying this claim, we 
review that denial for plain error.  Nara, 488 F.3d at 196.  
When reviewing for plain error, we reverse only if the error is 
“(1) clear or obvious, (2) affect[ed] substantial rights, and (3) 
seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”  Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 363 
(3d Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Only the first prong of this three-part test is satisfied 
in Wilkerson’s case.  At Wilkerson’s trial, the parties stipulated 
to the introduction of medical records that reflected Nasir Hill 
was taken to the hospital to receive emergency surgery for a 
gunshot wound in his chest.  In view of that record, Wilkerson 
does not challenge the seriousness of Hill’s injuries resulting 
from the shooting, and we agree with the Magistrate Judge that, 
had the jury been asked, it is “inconceivable” that it would not 
have made the requisite finding of “serious bodily injury” for 
Wilkerson to receive an enhanced sentence.  App. 77.  Thus, 
because it is a near certainty that Wilkerson would have 
received the identical sentence had the jury been given the 
proper instruction, Wilkerson cannot demonstrate that this 
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V. Conclusion  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order granting a writ of habeas corpus on Wilkerson’s 
double jeopardy claim, affirm the District Court’s order 
denying relief on all other claims, and remand the case for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                 
Apprendi error, or any ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 
derived from it, “affect[ed] his substantial rights” or “seriously 
affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  Leyva, 504 F.3d at 363 (alteration in original).  
See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632-33 (2002) 
(holding Apprendi error cannot meet the plain error 
requirement of “seriously affect[ing] the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings” when the fact that 
increased the defendant’s sentence without having been 
submitted to the jury was supported by “overwhelming” 
evidence that was “essentially uncontroverted”); United States 
v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 101 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding 
substantial rights are not affected by an Apprendi violation 
where “the court determines that the evidence was sufficiently 
conclusive to support the sentence actually imposed”).  
  
